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Strategic Relationships, Risk, and Proxy War
Abstract
Proxy wars dominate modern war fighting. Despite the frequency of proxy wars on today's
battle field, the strategic studies community lacks sufficient models and strategic theories
to frame proxy wars from the strategic level. This works seeks to build on the limited
amount of preexisting theoretical work on proxy war by introducing five models of proxy
relation - coerced, transactional, cultural, exploitative, and contractual. This models help
policymakers, strategists, and practitioners understand and navigate through the strategic
workings of today's proxy wars.
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Introduction
Proxy war is creeping back to a point of strategic relevance.
Simultaneously, proxy war’s slow, abstruse move to a position of
dominance in contemporary armed conflict has occurred in an
environment wanting of a strategic theoretical framework. Most
contemporary proxy war literature offers cursory definitions of the
phenomena but fails to articulate the strategic mechanics amongst actors
found therein. In many cases policymakers, strategists, and practitioners
apply an anchor bias when analyzing proxy war, or they weaponize a
narrative to offset the coarseness of proxy relationships and they describe
those relationships in a more palatable manner. For example, in a recent
discussion on proxy war, analysts Jack Watling and Erica Gaston
mentioned that few state actors are willing to openly define proxy
relationships in that manner because of the negative connotations
associated with the proxy label.1
Yet, in softening proxy war’s coarseness the distinct character of a proxy
relationship is overlooked, hidden, and lost. The U.S. Department of
Defense’s joint force doctrine, for example, incorrectly categorizes the
strategic relationship of proxy war by contending that when state actors
employ proxies in pursuit of their objectives, they (the state actor) are
operating outside of armed conflict, while their proxies are operating
within the realm of armed conflict.2 This assertion is incorrect because by
virtue of employing a surrogate to accomplish its military objectives, which
support the larger policy objectives, a state actor is engaged in armed
conflict. Furthermore, as is evident in state actor-driven proxy wars, state
actors provide combat advisors, liaisons, logistics, and other military and
support capabilities that enable its proxy to accomplish its (the state
actor’s) military objectives.
Based on the arch of the current strategic environment, which portends
continued proxy wars, it is paramount for the strategic studies community
to continue developing theoretical taxonomies that allow policymakers,
strategists, practitioners, and historians to effectively navigate proxy war’s
murky waters. To be sure, as Professor Vladimir Rauta contends, “In order
to prevent or prevail in fighting proxy wars a strategic understanding of
why proxy wars are waged is needed.”3 This work’s goal is to shed further
light on the broad character of strategic actors within proxy environments
1
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and describe how risk—strategic and existential—factors into those
relationships. Risk, for its part, is the binding agent between principal and
proxy, and by extension, the cleavage points between those actors.
Although proxyism—a unified theory of proxy war—is again gaining
relevance in war, proxies and proxyism have a long, rich history in the
conduct of war. This history, coupled with recent observations in proxy
war provide a useful window into the mechanics and character of proxy
war, proxy relationships, and how risk influences the proxy environment.
Historian John Keegan contends that surrogates have long played an
important role in war.4 For example, Italian condottieri and Swedish
companies for-hire were contractual proxies that played pivotal roles in
the wars of the Middle Ages.5 The Great Northern War’s (1700-1721) battle
of Poltava (July 8, 1709)—decisive in facilitating Sweden’s strategic decline
while igniting Russia’s rise on the international stage—saw both Sweden
and the Tsardom of Muscovy heavily rely on Cossack proxies to increase
their pool of available forces and offset the loss of their native forces. 6
Hessians—German contractual proxies for hire from the state of Hesse—
played important roles during the eighteenth and nineteenth century,
perhaps none more noticeable than serving as British auxiliaries during
the American Revolution.7 This says nothing of the Cold War’s prodigious
count of proxy wars as the Soviet Union and the West battled for
ideological supremacy around the globe.
Although dormant for many years, Russia’s 2014 invasion of eastern
Ukraine ushered in a new era of proxy war. Russia’s employment of
culturally aligned and contractual proxies, dedicated to Moscow and the
Kremlin’s policy objectives, shook the western world as it watched Ukraine
lose control of large portions of its country. Western governments are
articulating the prevalence of proxy force employment around the globe.
American combatant commander reports to the U.S. Congress regularly
highlight the threat posed by proxies within their specific areas of
responsibility. Outside the U.S., in a 2019 speech, former U.K. Defense
Secretary Penny Mordaunt argued about the dangers of proxy forces in
modern armed conflict and for a credible deterrent to those dangers.8
Despite the vociferous contentions from commenters such as historian
Lawrence Freedman or analyst Michael Kofman, July 2020’s Trilateral
Contact Group agreement between Ukraine, Russia’s proxies, and
Moscow, all but rubber-stamped the Kremlin’s strategic and territorial
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gains in Ukraine’s Donets River Basin (Donbas), demonstrating how
effective proxy campaigns can result in strategic wins.9
Based on proxy war’s far-reaching nature in today’s strategic environment,
it is paramount to further develop proxy war’s strategic framework and
map the basic structure of relationships between strategic actors therein.
This work seeks to increase the strategic and defense study community’s
professional body of knowledge on proxy war. It does so by adding to
proxy war’s existing literature. Specifically, this work further advances the
idea that five models of strategic relationship—exploitative, coercive,
cultural, contractual or transactional—exist within a proxy war framework.
A proxy, or principal-agent relationship, takes one of these five forms. Risk
is the sinew that binds, and conversely, can lead to the unraveling of actors
within a principal-agent relationship. Adroit players and observers in
proxy war understand this and seek to manipulate it, much in the same
fashion Napoleon Bonaparte employed his strategy of central position
throughout the Napoleonic Wars. This work elaborates on this idea,
discussing how strategic and existential risk can be manipulated in proxy
war both for and against a principal-proxy dyad. A brief review of terms
and definitions are required before beginning that analysis.

Definitions, Terms of Reference, and Framing Proxy
Relationships
Proxy war and its associated ideas and terms are contested concepts. As a
result, no standard exists in which to point to guide proxy war discussions.
In the absence of an accepted set of concepts and lexicon, those listed
within this section are the standard used throughout this work.
Proxy war is a broad taxonomy of armed conflict, not a discrete form or
type of warfighting. Broadly associating one form of warfighting with
proxy war demonstrates intellectual laziness and is not useful in making
sense of the phenomena. While proxy wars fight be fought through
partisans or insurgents as irregular wars or insurgencies, this is not the
only way in which these types of wars are fought. Russia’s rapacious hybrid
campaign in eastern Ukraine, which heavily relied on conventional combat
operations, stresses this point. The war’s Donbas Campaign, which birthed
the violent, bloody, and destructive battles of Ilovaisk, Donetsk Airport,
Luhansk Airport, and Debal’tseve, has resulted in 13,200 Ukrainian dead
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and 30,000 wounded since the war began in the spring of 2014.10 This is a
clear signal that today’s proxy wars are more than just state-sponsored
insurgencies waged in political hinterlands, but instead can fall anywhere
along the continuum of conflict.A proxy war’s form or method of
warfighting is subject to each participant’s political narrative, preference,
objectives, and resources. The principal, on the other hand, is constrained
by the narratives, objectives, and resource limitations of its chosen agent,
and the bond that exists between it and its surrogate.
Equally important, proxies must not be taken entirely as non-state actors.
Proxy forces, based upon the type of principal-agent dyad, can span the
spectrum from state armies fighting as surrogates for a benefactor, to
proto-state forces fighting for international legitimation, to partisan
groups cobbled together by an actor to do its tactical dirty work.
Nevertheless, the group identity of the actor filling the role of proxy is not
as important as the type of relationship between the principal and the
proxy. The relationship’s character is the glue that bonds the two actors
into a singular whole.
Moreover, a proxy war is one in which two or more actors, working against
a common adversary, strive to achieve a common objective.11 This dyad is
governed by a principal-agent reciprocation, time, and power dynamics.
See Figure 1, Proxy Environment. Within the dyad, the principal actor
operates indirectly, through another actor—an agent, surrogate,
interlocutor, or proxy—to accomplish its strategic objective or curate its
strategic interests. By virtue of working on behalf of the principal, whether
willfully or by coercive means, the principal’s objectives become that of the
surrogate actor.12 As theorists Carl von Clausewitz and B.H. Liddell Hart
note, problems of risk-sharing and agency accompany a principal-agent
dyad. According to Carl von Clausewitz, “One country may support
another’s cause, but will never take it as serious as it takes its own.” 13
Meanwhile, Liddell Hart posits that, “No agreement between governments
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has had any stability beyond their recognition that it is in their own
interest to adhere to it.”14
Figure 1: Proxy Environment

Source: Author

Professor Kathleen Eisenhardt suggests that these problems arise when
the ambition or aims of the two actors become misoriented or come into
conflict with each other.15 Additionally, Eisenhardt contends that this
occurs when the actor’s attitudes and acceptance of risk are misaligned.16
In turn, risk’s impact on the relationship tends to result in dyad divergence
as contact with risk continues.17
Recent work on proxy war suggests that two models of relationship exist
within proxy war—transactional and exploitative models.18 Current proxy
war research argues that these two models do not fully articulate the
character of relationships in proxy environments. Analysis focused on risk,
commitment, investment cost, and strategic interaction amongst partners
instead suggests that five relationship models subsist within proxy war.
These models—exploitative, coercive, cultural, contractual and
transactional—provide the policymaker, strategist, practitioner, and
5
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historian useful tools for making sense of proxy war. Furthermore,
understanding risk, and how it can be manipulated to accelerate or
decelerate divergence within a principal-agent dyad, can further assist
those interested or involved in proxy wars.

The Exploitative Model—The Parasitic Model
In the exploitative model the proxy is dependent on the principal for
survival. A parasite and a host are a useful mental model to visual when
pondering the exploitative model. In this situation, the principal serves as
the host, while the proxy serves as the parasite—it would not survive
without being able to leech off the host. Yet, paradoxically, the proxy
provides value to the principal in this arrangement, and therefore, the
principal will do what it must to ensure its proxy’s survival. This reliance
creates a strong bond between the proxy and the partner, resulting in the
partner possessing near boundless power and influence over the proxy.
Russia’s support for its Ukrainian proxy during the Russo-Ukrainian War
(2014-present) is a useful example to demonstrate this point. During
several critical battles, to include Ilovaisk, Second Donetsk Airport, and
Debal’tseve, Russian land forces came to the relief of their overwhelmed
and outmatched proxies during the Donbas Campaign.19
This model tends to be the result of a strong actor looking to outsource
tactical combat operations, for a variety of reasons, to a weaker actor. As a
result, the newly acquired proxy is only useful to the principal insofar as its
ability to accomplish the principal’s objectives. Resultantly, exploitative
proxy dyads are temporary—once the principal’s ends have been achieved,
or the proxy is unable to maintain momentum towards the principal’s ends
then the principal tends to discontinue the relationship.
Additionally, if the principal assesses that is proxy is gaining too much
strength or independence, the principal will often eradicate political,
strategic, or influential proxy leaders to maintain its primacy within the
relationship. Theorist Colmar von der Goltz contends that, “The assailant
also incurs the danger of losing allies who are willing to support him up to
a certain point, but do not wish to see him grown strong at their
expense.”20 The dubious assassinations of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s
Prime Minister Alexander Zakharchenko in August 2018 and acclaimed
military commanders Mikhail Tolstykh in February 2017 and Arseny
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Pavlov in October 2016 fall into this category.21 Open-source reporting
makes attribution challenging to identify, but many sources contend that
Zakharchenko, Tolstykh, and Pavlov were assassinated by Russian agents
to neutralize their growing power and notoriety and to keep their Donbas
proxies weak and compliant to Moscow.22
The United States has a similar, yet less violent relationship with its
counter-ISIS proxy in Syria. The United States military manufactured the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from a mixed bag of Syrian Kurdish
militias, to include the People’s Protection Units, or YPG.23 As the result of
early success in the deserts and cities in eastern and northern Syria, the
SDF branched out and established a political wing—the Syrian Democratic
Council (SDC)— to advance its political agenda.24 Kurdish self-rule in
Syria’s Western Kurdistan region, also known as Rojava, is the primary
goal of the SDF-SDC pact.25
Yet, Kurdish self-rule, as also seen in Iraq, presents a unique problem for
principal actors locked in formal politico-military alliances such as NATO.
Kurdish independence and self-rule are a major point of contention for
Turkey, a US NATO ally. Turkey formally objected to the SDF and SDC’s
growing power and influence in Syria and expressed this objection
militarily. Since 2018, Turkey has conducted many military operations, to
include Operation Olive Branch, to undercut the SDF-SDC’s growing
political and military strength in Syria.26 Turkey’s voracious objections in
northern Syrian Kurdish territory and Rojava have derailed ongoing USSDF military operations on several occasions, resulting in strategic and
operational pauses in the US-SDF campaign to defeat ISIS.27 As a formal
alliance member with Turkey, the US stood by and watched its proxy take
a thrashing as it battled to protect its homeland from the Turks.28 As a
result of the battles with Turkey, the SDF has been beaten into a shell of
the 60,000-man proxy force that it once was.29It is also important to note
that exploitative proxies, which are often various groups brigaded together
by a stronger actor to achieve a common objective, are challenged to
remain unified as they approach mission accomplishment. The SDF in
Syria, as but one example, experienced this unraveling as the group’s
impetus, defeating the Islamic State, slowly recedes into the background.30
To close the discussion on exploitative proxy relationships, it is important
to underscore that proxy success can change the relationship between the
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principal and the proxy. Successful proxies that can avoid punitive
principals can generate sufficient legitimacy to outgrow is subservient
relationship with its principal. Battlefield success and political moves can
set dependent, exploited proxies free. Conversely, if a principal anticipates
an exploitative proxy as a more useful tool in a more independent status, it
might elect to allow that actor to gain more political power and
independence.

The Coercive Model—Impressment of Unwilling Contributors
The coercive model is centered on the impressment of unwilling or
reluctant contributors. In this model the proxy is a pre-existing
environmental actor that is coerced into a principal-agent relationship
with a strong actor. The impressed or coerced proxy possesses a low
willingness to shoulder the risk that comes with being a proxy, and
therefore, the relationship’s bond is loose. To be sure, it is often only the
principal’s physical presence that keeps the coerced proxy working on
behalf of the principal. In turn, the proxy is given a minimal autonomy and
the principal often micro-manages the proxy because of the lose bond
between the two.
Coerced proxy relationships are often fraught with internal danger for the
principal and the proxy. The proxy is subject to harsh punishment by the
principal, while the principal must worry about inside attacks by the
proxy. Resultantly, a principal must often employ internal security forces
while working with and alongside a coerced proxy. The American
employment of security forces to protect itself from its Afghan proxies in
Afghanistan is one example of this idea.31
The coerced proxy is often the byproduct of a situation in which a principal
has come into an area and defeated the existing ruling body and its
security forces. Following that defeat, the principal coopts trusted
elements from the defeated regime’s security forces. The proxy, either
indifferent to the occupying power, or concerned about the effect of
cooperating with the principal, displays little motivation for working with
the occupier and displays limited capability, whether that be in the form of
governance or security.
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Germany’s use of Soviet proxies on the Eastern Front of World War II is
an informative example of a coerced proxy. Shortly after the halcyon days
of 1939-1941, Nazi Germany found itself bogged down in the Soviet Union
and facing manpower shortages as it extended beyond its operational
reach.32 Historian Robert Citino notes, “It was in southern Russia that
Bewegungskrieg ground to a halt, giving way to the very type of war that
the German Army had historically tried to avoid: Stellungskrieg…After
their promising starts, the German offensives of 1942 would give birth to
twins: Stalingrad and El Alamein.”33
In light of this snowballing calamity, the Wehrmacht began to press
Soviets into service along the Eastern Front; hilfswillige, or hiwi, is the
term that became associated with these surrogates.34 Historian Antony
Beevor contends that while a small number of hiwis were willing
participants, most, especially by the time of the battle of Stalingrad, were
Soviet prisoners of war coerced into service by the Wehrmacht.35
Germany’s Sixth Army, its primary warfighting formation at the battle of
Stalingrad, had 50,000 Russian proxies aligned with its front-line
divisions.36 This number roughly equated to twenty-five percent of
Germany’s total force in Stalingrad.37 After the Soviet victory at Stalingrad,
the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, or NKVD, imprisoned or
killed most of the hiwis that it was able to identify.38
Although not to suggest parallels between Nazi Germany’s proxy strategy
in World War II with American proxy strategy in the post-September 11,
2001 strategic security space, the United States’ relationship with the
government of Afghanistan and the Afghan security forces is a
contemporary instance of the coerced proxy model. Following the
Taliban’s initial defeat in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002, U.S.
forces created the Afghan army and its security apparatus from scratch. 39
In this relationship the United States is the principal actor, and the
Afghans are the coerced proxy. Together both parties combat the Taliban,
Al Qaeda, and many other splinter groups and non-strategic actors that
have materialized during twenty years of war.
Yet the Afghans are a coerced partner, forced to both work with the United
States military (and its NATO partners) and to combat the Taliban and
other security threats. Due to the lack of buy-in, Afghan security forces are
often reluctant to work with U.S. forces and, despite nineteen years of
9
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focus on building Afghan capacity, Afghan forces demonstrate limited
combat capability. The Afghan’s disinterest in risk sharing and lack of
agency resulted in the Taliban re-taking many parts of the country. The
Taliban argue that they control 70 percent of Afghanistan.40 On the other
end of the spectrum, one reputable report contends that the government of
Afghanistan controls 54 percent of the country, while the Taliban controls
13 percent, and the remaining 33 percent of the country is actively
contested between those two warring parties.41 The Afghan government
and its security force’s inability and unwillingness to eliminate the
Taliban—a true existential threat to both those institutions—despite
almost two decades of train, advise, and assist support from the United
States and NATO strongly points to the coerced character between the
Afghans and the United States. Furthermore, the significant number of
insider attacks levied by the Afghans against American forces in
Afghanistan points to the relationship’s friction brought about by its
coerced bond.42
Beyond Afghanistan, analyst Jack Watling propounds that several groups
in Syria also fall into the coerced proxy category. Watling notes that many
Islamic rebel groups fighting against the Al-Assad regime have consumed
fledgling, non-Islamic rebel groups of the Free Syrian Army and pressed
them into service.43 As the fighting in Syria has worn non-Islamic rebel
groups down, the stronger, more powerful Islamic rebel groups have
coerced the weaker groups to join forces with them against President
Bashar al-Assad.44
Power is the driving force that binds the principal and proxy in a coerced
relationship. Power binds the dyad because the bond between the
principal and proxy, based on the proxy’s willingness to share risk and
assume agency, is so feeble.45 The principal’s ability to make the proxy do
something it would not otherwise do, such as Soviets fighting under the
swastika against the Soviet Union, or Afghan soldiers fighting the Taliban
on behalf of the United States, clearly demonstrates power’s efficacy in the
coerced model.46

10
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss2/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.2.1879

Fox: Strategic Relationships, Risk, and Proxy War

The Cultural Model—Cousins and Like-Minded Believers
Working Together
Writing in his classic work, A History of Warfare, historian John Keegan
breaks free of the shackles of Clausewitzian thought, focused on war being
a political endeavor, and instead forces the reader to address the
relationship between culture and war. Breaking ranks with Clausewitz,
Keegan argues, “War embraces much more than politics: that it is always
an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural form, in some
societies the culture itself.”47 Keegan’s position is the starting point for
understanding proxy war’s cultural principal-agent relationship. Because
culture is rooted in self-identity, cultural bonds in a principal-proxy dyad
are extremely strong, forming an abiding relationship.
As the history of war and international competition shows, cultural
connections often exist beyond the limits of the political map. The major
features of culture—religion, ethnicity, and language—as well as
geographic precedence are often used as leverage to generate proxies in
heterogeneous areas where proxy wars materialize. Cultural proxies are
the result of a principal actor tapping into existing cultural demographics
to obtain power and influence over a group of individuals. Russia’s use of
culturally similar groups in eastern Ukraine to build a proxy government
and proxy army are a useful illustration of this model.
For much of its history, Ukraine has been part of Russia, either in part or
in whole. Because of that relationship with Russia Ukraine differs greatly
from west to east. Western Ukraine is predominately ethnic Ukrainian,
Catholic, and heavily populated with Ukrainian speakers. Eastern Ukraine,
on the other hand, carries the legacy of imperial Russia. Many portions of
eastern Ukraine’s Donbas belonged to Imperial Russia throughout the rule
of the Romanov czars. As recent as 1922, the Novorossiya region of
Ukraine—Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Odessa, Zaporizhia, and Mykolaiv—
belonged to Russia, while Crimea did not become part of Ukraine until
1954.48 Resultantly, much of the eastern expanse of Ukraine, to include its
border with Russia, is populated by ethnic Russians, Russophones, and
Eastern Orthodox Christians who are intermixed with Catholic, Ukrainianspeaking ethnic Ukrainians.49
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Under the Romanov dynasty the czars stylized their holdings, of which
Ukraine was a centerpiece, as All Russias. Cleverly manipulating historical
precedent and geographic pedigree, Russian President Vladimir Putin
used the All Russias and Novorossiya concepts to legitimize the Kremlin’s
political and military ambitions in Ukraine.50 To be sure, during the
ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war’s outset, Putin and foreign minister Sergey
Lavrov often employed the term Novorossiya and its historical lineage
within the All Russias framework to justify Russian aggression in
Ukraine.51 As part of this advocacy, Putin and Lavrov said it was Russia’s
right to protect ethnic Russians, Russophones, and Eastern Orthodox
Christians abroad, to include those in Ukraine.52 In sum, Russia made use
of history, geography, and cultural demographics to cultivate sympathetic
supporters in Ukraine to build proxy governments and proxy armies to
combat Kyiv.
Moving to the Middle East, Iran provides an excellent case study for this
model too. Iran uses cultural ties, generally the Shiite branch of Islam, to
build strong-bonded proxies throughout the Middle East. Lebanon’s
Hezbollah and Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah are Iran’s most notable proxies
across the Shia Crescent, while it also supports the Houthi rebels in
Yemen, Hamas, and a host of Shia militia groups in Syria and Iraq.53 Iran’s
Quds Force, a keystone feature within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, is the prime mover for its proxies. The Quds Force provides
funding, support, and advisors to its proxies, in addition to strategic and
tactical planning.54
As Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq demonstrates, cultural bonds between
principal and proxy are strong and result in the proxy willing to share high
degrees of risk with their principal.55 Since its inception following the
2003 American-led invasion of Iraq, Kata’ib Hezbollah has provoked and
fought the United States, directly and indirectly, on behalf of Iran.56
Further, the group’s continued resistance to American interests in Iraq
following the assassination of its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in
January 2020, demonstrates that cultural proxies tend to stick by their
principal despite increasing levels of risk.57
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The Contractual Model—Mercenaries and other Guns for Hire
The contractual model is perhaps one of the oldest relational models
between principal and agent. This model carries such historic significance
that Niccolò Machiavelli makes mention of it in his classic political and
military treatise, The Prince.58 In the contractual model, the principal
subcontracts the work of warfighting to an existing firm or business that
possesses the military means to obtain the principal’s goals.
Contractual proxies afford several benefits to the principal. First, it
increases the distance between the principal and the horrors of war, thus
decreasing its domestic and political risk. Second, contractual proxies
negate the deployment of large military formations, thereby increasing
operational secrecy and deniability. Third, contractual proxies are a quick
and easy way to get quasi-military forces on the ground, increasing the
principal’s tactical options and hastening its response time.
Contractual proxies loom large in modern wars in the Middle East.
Companies such as MPRI, Aegis, Blackwater, and Triple Canopy became
household names during the early years of American-led Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Personnel from these companies were found fighting alongside
U.S. military personnel. One example, 2004’s battle of Najaf, saw
Blackwater personnel help turn the tide of battle in favor of the U.S. Army
and Marines with whom they were fighting.59 In March 2004, the murder
of four Blackwater personnel provided the impetus for the First and
Second Battles of Fallujah, which burned hot through the remainder of
2004.60 Later, in 2007, Blackwater was involved in the indiscriminate
killing of more than 20 Iraqis in Baghdad’s Mansour Square. The
slaughter stoked the fire of an increasingly deadly and out of control
insurgency, further complicating the American mission in Iraq.61
Rebranded several times since its troublesome days in Iraq, Blackwater
and its head, Erik Prince, continue to offer contractual proxy solutions to
state-based problems in armed conflict, as his 2018 push to privatize the
war in Afghanistan illustrates.62
Russia’s Wagner Group is the most visible example of this model today. A
brief battle with American Special Forces and SDF proxies in February
2018 at Dier ez-Zor, Syria pulled the Wagner Group out of the shadows
and thrust it into the international community’s watchful eyes. The battle
13
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was short, lasting only a few hours, but savage, resulting in the death of
over 200 Wagner contractors.63
Wagner’s employment extends well beyond the Syrian desert. The group is
reported to operate in Ukraine, South America, and Africa; however, its
reach is likely broader than that.64 The arrest of 33 Wagner contractors
during the height of political upheaval in Belarus on July 29, 2020 is a
clear indication of this broader reach.65
The Taliban in Afghanistan offer another example of how contractual
proxies are employed. Russia and Iran, looking to further bog down the
United States in Afghanistan, and continue to discredit America’s ability to
effectively manage the Afghan war, are both guilty of enlisting the Taliban
to serve as a proxy on its behalf. In the summer of 2020, reports surfaced
that both Russia, through its intelligence service the GRU, and Iran,
through several Kabul-based front companies, paid bounties to the Taliban
and its associates to kill American and NATO soldiers.66 The Taliban—
Russia and Iran’s de facto proxy—allowed both countries to wage a lowscale, low-cost proxy war against the United States and NATO in
Afghanistan.
The bond between principal and agent in a contractual relationship is high
because the proxy would not accept the contract if it were uncomfortable
with the agreement’s inherent risk, nor would the principal hire the agent
if it were not willing to assume a high degree of risk. Nevertheless, the
dyad possesses a two-hold decoupling point. A contractual proxy will
distance itself or nullify the contract if it finds itself butting up upon
existential crisis. Second, the principal will nullify the agreement if that
proxy’s presence cuts against the principal’s strategic goals. The Wagner
Group and Blackwater illustrate these concepts. Wagner’s defeat at Deir
ez-Zor is within a contractual proxy’s capacity to absorb.67 However,
situations such as Blackwater’s continued presence in Iraq following its
slaughter of innocent Iraqis in Baghdad’s Mansour Square, increase
strategic risk for both partners to the point in which the relationship is
toxic for both partners, and must be culled.68
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The Transactional Model—The Business Deal Amongst
Strategic Actors
The transactional model is the most challenging to comprehend because it
is often misconstrued as either a coalition, an alliance, or a partnership.
The transaction model roughly equates to a business deal amongst
strategic actors. The character of the transactional model of relationship
within proxy war is long understood. To be sure, theorist Carl von
Clausewitz commented on this idea in his classic treatise On War.
Clausewitz writes that:
But even when both states are in earnest about making war upon
the third, they do not always say, “we must treat this country as our
common enemy and destroy it, or we shall be destroyed ourselves.”
Far from it: The affair is more often like a business deal.69
The mutual exchange of services and goods, which provides reciprocated
benefit for the principal and proxy, is the transactional model’s
harmonizing feature. This model is unique because political negotiation
amongst strategic actors drives the arrangement of the principal-proxy
dyad from the strategic to tactical levels. In this model, mutual interest
often brings strategic actors together. However, the deliberation on how to
achieve their mutual interest impacts how and who becomes the principal
and the proxy at the levels of war. In most instances, the stronger of the
two actors tends to fill the principal vacancies, whereas the weaker actor
serves as the proxy. The recent campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq
serves as a useful example to explain the transactional model. In 2014 the
government of Iraq sought international help from the United States,
among others, to combat ISIS.70 Politically, both the United States and
government of Iraq set the war’s major policy objectives. Strategically and
operationally, however, the government of Iraq and the Iraqi military set
the military objectives but were supported and advised by the United
States and its coalition partners. At the tactical level, American forces
fought a proxy campaign against the Islamic State through Iraqi regular
and irregular forces.
As the name implies, this model is based on a transactional relationship
between actors. This results in a relationship that has a fixed duration, and
the life expectancy of a transactional relationship begins to erode once the
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first shots in combat are fired. Subsequently, the proxy’s interest in the
principal recedes at a comparable rate to the accomplishment of the two
actor’s common interest. Harkening back to the Iraq example, one finds
that the United States began to rapidly lose influence with the government
of Iraq and Iraqi military following victory at Mosul in July 2017 and Tal
A’far in August 2017.71 There was no bigger signal of this divergence and
loss of influence than Iraq’s campaign to stymy Kurdish independence in
October 2017, which was conducted against the recommendations or
support United States.72 Moreover, Prime Minister Haider Abadi’s calls for
the redeployment of American troops in the wake of the government of
Iraqi’s declaration of victory against ISIS in December 2017 further
illustrates this concept.73
As the U.S.-Iraq example suggests, the transactional model sees the proxy
force’s government request support from other strategic actor(s) to defeat
a threat. In doing so, the proxy force’s government places parameters on
the principal and on the duration of the mission. The proxy government
issues parameters to align the principal with its own political and military
objectives. It is also important to note that the proxy has fixed political and
social interest in the principal, therefore it attempts to terminate the
partnership upon attainment of its goals.
Proto-states or polities vying for legitimacy appear on the other side of the
transactional proxy spectrum. Harkening back to the Cossacks and the
Great Northern War’s battle of Poltava, both Sweden and Russia offered
varying degrees of support to the Cossack Hetmanate in exchange for
assistance battling the other.74 Sweden mustered approximately 5,000
Cossack proxies for the battle, while Russia drew support from around
15,000 Cossacks.75 Each Cossack group made different deals with their
respective principal, but once the Tsardom of Muscovy achieved victory
over Sweden, the Tsardom severely curtailed the rights and independence
of all Cossacks within its realm.76 Similar to the previous example, this
version of the transactional relationship is also a business deal with the
relationship metered against a running clock. This variation differs from
the previous example in that the principal is solely in the lead, whereas in
the first variation, the proxy has much more power.The transactional
model is fraught with potential danger for the principal because the agent
is not entirely dependent on the principal, making it susceptible to
external influence. The proxy’s comment to the principal and their
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common interest is tied to self-interest and not necessarily survival,
opening it up to break its pact with the principal when it no longer profits
from the relationship or finds danger in the relationship.

Risk in Proxy War
This survey of relationships in proxy war reveals that risk is the glue that
binds a proxy dyad, but risk is equally the wedge issue to separate actors in
a principal-proxy relationship. Both tactical and strategic risk affect the
relationship in different ways. The impact is dependent on the dyad’s bond
and on the character, or type of relationship between the principal and
agent. While not scientific because it is nearly impossible to measure
intangibles such as commitment, it is useful to identify the relative
strength and weakness of proxy partnerships based upon their tolerance
for tactical and strategic risk. Doing so provides a useful model for further
examining and forecasting proxy wars.
Risk also stimulates the transition between a short-term and long-term
proxy war. If tested, coerced, contractual, and transactional proxy
relationships will unravel far quicker than exploitative or cultural proxy
relationships when presented with moderate to high levels of existential or
strategic risk.77 This is because the coupling in the first three models is not
as tight as that found in the latter two.78 Exploitative or cultural
relationships tend to continue longer because they are willing to carry
higher degrees of risk than the other three models.
Risk, serving as a proxy relationship’s exploitable cleft, can be used to
separate and defeat a proxy relationship. Proxy relationships can be
addressed in a similar manner to the Napoleonic strategy of central
position. By that, an actor seeks to separate, or maintained dispersion
between converging forces, in order to fight one adversary at a time, and
thus, defeat the opponents in detail.79 Bonaparte’s employment of the
flexible corps system throughout the Wars of the Third and Fourth
Coalitions’ campaigns are useful example to keep in mind when thinking
about the utility of this concept.80 See Figure 2, Risk in Proxy War.
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Figure 2: Risk in Proxy War

Source: Author

Conclusion
Proxy war’s frequency and pervasiveness in modern armed conflict reveals
its political and strategic viability. While insurgencies or partisan wars are
motivated by individual political interest, today’s proxy wars are an
expression of great power competition. Resultantly, the insurgent or
partisan is important to understand in small wars, but not so in proxy
wars. An appreciation for what fixes partners in a principal-agent
relationship is the important thing to understand about proxy wars. The
bonding amongst partners is germane because it is the catalyst and the
lubricant within the engine of proxy war.
Two variables are critical to account for when analyzing proxy
relationships. The first is agency, or which partner owns the problem.
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Second, and more important, is risk-sharing. Risk-sharing, from a broader
perspective, is the defining variable in principal-proxy relationships
because it serves as the adhesive between two cooperating parties. In most
cases risk-sharing is what determines the duration of any principal-agent
relationship and the tight or looseness of the bond between partners.
Analyzing risk as it relates to a principal and its agent is central to
understanding proxy relationships. This analysis provides the framework
for strategists, planners, and leaders to either defeat a principal-proxy on
the battlefield or protect one’s own principal-agent relationship. Theorist
Thomas Schelling provides useful counsel on risk when thinking about
risk-sharing in proxy relationships. He posits that, “The questions that do
arise involve degrees of risk—what risk is worth taking, and how to
evaluate risk involved in a course of action…It adds an entire dimension to
military relations: the manipulation of risk.”81 Schelling’s proposition,
when viewed in relation to the bond between principals and proxies results
in the acknowledgement that risk is a wedge issue between actors. This, in
essence, results in the five models of relationship in proxy war—
exploitative, coercive, cultural, contractual, or transactional.
Exploited proxy relationships are short but the bond amongst actors is
strong. Coerced proxy relationships result in weak bonds between partners
and the proxy’s commitment is causally linked to the principal’s physical
presence as an occupying force. Cultural proxy relationships are extremely
strong and the duration prodigious because of the stalwart cultural bond
between principal and agent. Contractual proxy relationships, on the other
hand, are firm because of the inspiration provided by the profit motive.
Moreover, the contractual proxy knowingly accepts the strategic and
tactical risk before entering a principal-agent relationship. This results in a
tight tactical bond, but that bond loosens at the strategic level. The
relationship tethers because a principal will divorce itself from its
contractual proxy if that proxy jeopardizes its (the principal’s) strategic
aims. Conversely, the contractual proxy will craft an exit plan if it
approaches existential crisis. Importantly, contractual proxyism
dominates today’s proxy wars. As analyst Sean McFate notes, private
military companies and mercenaries operate globally and transparent to
the public.82 As long as this continues, contractual proxies will continue to
loom large in proxy war.83 Furthermore, as war pushes further into the
Grey Zone via hybrid means, the demand for contractual agents will
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increase. Lastly, transactional proxy relationship is akin to a business deal
and they last as long as their mutual interests serve both actors.
Resultantly, the bond between the actors in a transactional proxy
relationship is weak and unravels upon completion of the unifying
strategic aims.
Proxy war is here to stay. Proxy wars will continue to dominate armed
conflict so long as nuclear weapons cast a long shadow over great power
and medium power conflict. Additionally, proxy war will continue to
dominate armed conflict so long as governments are interested in
decreasing their political risks associated with war. Proxy wars abstruse
involvement in war by deferring the cost to surrogates, who do the fighting
and dying for a thankless and unknowing public far away from the
battlefield. This arrangement makes war a more pervasive tool for policy
makers and strategists.
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